The article discusses the plausibility of five different paths of institutional development of the European Union: deepening integration towards a federal state, a differentiated and flexible union, covert integration, a segmented political order and disintegration/dissolution Systematically varying either the preferences of the main actors or the macro conditions, i.e. decision-making rules, and external shocks, it discusses the plausibility of these paths and their overall effects on the European polity. ; This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304.
Publication date: 4 February 2019 ; The purpose of this paper is to assess the plausibility of four different mid-term paths of development of the European Union (EU): first, a political union or a European state; second, a differentiated and flexible integration of the polity; third, a covert and deepening integration of the polity outside of the political arenas; fourth, the disintegration and/or dissolution of the EU through the exit of individual members or a joint decision to terminate the union. Design/methodology/approach The paper uses strategic interaction analysis to identify the plausibility of each of these four possible outcomes. By systematically varying the relevant actors', i.e. European Council's and member states', the European Parliament's, the Commission's, preferences over outcomes while holding constant institutional rules of decision making on the one hand, and systematically varying institutional rules on the other while holdings actors' preferences constant, the paper comes to the conclusion that differentiated and flexible integration and covert integration are the most plausible mid-term paths of development. Findings The paper finds that neither a European state or deep political union nor a disintegration or even dissolution of the EU is the most plausible path of development. Rather, it concludes that flexible and differentiated integration as well as covert integration outside the political arenas are the most likely developments. However, it also draws attention to the political costs of flexible and differentiated integration which does not allow for an overall view of political and policy issues negotiated at one political table, limiting the scope of compromise formation and even leading to a fragmented polity. Covert integration consisting of mechanisms of hidden integration "invisible" to the wider public may lead to a democratic backlash, once citizens realize that integration has considerably deepened without their being aware of it. Originality/value Most publications regarding the future development of the EU are normatively driven, either conjuring an imminent disintegration, or invoking the necessity of a deepening integration leading to a political union. This paper, by contrast, seeks to assess the likely further development based on empirically identified factors and a logical argument.
The chapter focuses on how multilevel governance affects interstitial institutional change in decision-making in the EU. Interstitial institutional change occurs if formal institutional rules are ambiguous, and in consequence, when applied, are renegotiated by actors. Each concerned actor seeks to strengthen its own institutional power in these renegotiations in order to influence policy outcomes. This leads to an informal institutional change between formal treaty revisions. Héritier argues that MLG and multi-arena governance offer additional opportunities for actors to strengthen their institutional powers in the re-negotiation of incomplete formal rules during implementation, but may also set limits to such endeavours. The chapter analyses in three cases of European politics, the nomination and investiture of the Commission President, the nomination and investiture of individual Commissioners and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, the conditions in which multilevel and multi-arena strategies of the European Parliament bring about an informal interstitial institutional change. All these cases imply a power shift between European institutional actors in favour of the parliament.
Twenty years of practising codecision offers a welcome opportunity to pause and consider the structures, processes and policy impacts arising from this procedure and allows for a fine-grained analysis of the operation of codecision and its effects upon the various institutional actors. More specifically, it allows us to examine whether the European Parliament's (EP) role as a co-equal legislator has affected policy outcomes and patterns of democratic legitimacy within the wider political system of the European Union (EU). The editors of this collection are to be congratulated for collecting research results which differ greatly in their empirical focus and in the theories and methodologies used. They subject the diverse contributions to a set of common, important questions, i.e., how has the introduction of codecision affected political decision-making in the EU and to what extent has codecision contributed to a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making? Adapted from the source document.
This article explains how institutional rules change after they have been established in two important areas of European decision-making: co-decision and comitology. It shows how legislation under co-decision was transformed into fast-track legislation and why the Parliament gradually -- between treaty reforms -- gained more institutional power in comitology. The rational choice institutionalist explanation applied here focuses on the efficiency increasing/transaction cost saving aspects of interstitial institutional change, but also on the question of who gains and who loses in power under specific rules and how power may subsequently be shifted. The hypotheses derived from the theoretical considerations are subject to empirical (dis)confirmation on the basis of quantitative and qualitative empirical data collected on co-decision and delegation over time. The conclusion summarizes the argument and explores the applicability of the explanations to two other polities of regional integration: North Atlantic Free Trade Association (Nafta) and Mercosur (the Common Southern Market). Adapted from the source document.
Based on the analysis of the different policy areas discussed in this volume, this article proposes a strategic choice argument to account for the differential outcomes in the establishing of mutual recognition and, if instituted, for the divergent outcomes of its implementation in the different policy areas. In this article it is argued that a rational strategic choice argument may help to account for the differences in output, outcome and impact of mutual recognition across policy areas. Adapted from the source document.
The European Union (EU) is a "composite" democracy that features diverse forms of democratic legitimation: vertical legitimation through parliamentary representation in the European Parliament; executive representation through delegates of democratically elected governments in the Council of Ministers; horizontal mutual control among member states; associative & expert representation (delegation) in policy networks; &, finally, individual rights-based legitimacy. The argument developed in this article will proceed in four steps: (1) the various strands of democratic legitimation are described while locating transparency, & access to information in the overall context of attempts at democratic legitimation in the EU. (2) The program to increase transparency is specified in more detail. (3) A discussion gauges the compatibility of the relationship between access to information & transparency, on the one hand, & the central components of European democratic legitimation, on the other. (4) Normative conclusions will be drawn with respect to the possible functions that access to information & transparency -- bearing in mind the compatibility of the individual components -- serve in the context of Europe's composite democracy. 4 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.
The provision of utilities for all at an affordable price has long been regarded as a prerequisite for everyday life, generally guaranteed by the state. But in recent years, publicly owned utilities throughout Europe have come under increasing fire for their poor performance -- their lack of productive efficiency, their failure to identify consumer demands, & their lack of service innovation. As a consequence, & driven by the influence of neoliberal thought, many public monopolies have been, or are being, privatized, & utility markets are being deregulated. The experience of reform measures, instruments, & institutional arrangements allows us to tentatively take stock of the situation with regard to the quality of service provision. Are the public service goals of accessibility, security, continuity, & affordability still in place in the countries that have undergone reform? If so, to what extent have they been achieved, & what are the differences between sectors & countries? What are the underlying causes? This article presents the empirical data on service provision in two sectors, rail & telecommunications, & three countries, the UK, Germany, & France. Possible explanations for the level of performance are discussed. In a further step, general explanations are discussed in the light of the empirical data. 4 Tables, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.
There is a general political consensus that communicating by voice telephony, enjoying a certain degree of mobility, & using energy are basic needs that should be guaranteed & that firms operating in network industries should thus be subject to "public-service" objectives. Explored here is why, & to what extent, does a conflict exist between economic liberalization & general-interest goals in the first place? I then turn to the role of European policy making, which aims at striking a balance between the poles of market integration & competition, on the one hand, & the provision of public services, on the other. What are the existing European policies & how do they fare when measured against these two goals? I then focus on the central question of the analysis: how can the pro-general-interest decisions at the cross-sectoral & sectoral level (in energy, telecommunications, & rail) be accounted for in terms of the interaction of the formal political & legal actors involved in shaping the outcomes at the European level? 2 Tables, 4 Figures, 29 References. Adapted from the source document.
